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In the first article of this series we have introduced the debates on the ontology 
of power, while in the second one we have presented the main epistemological 
approaches of the different paradigms. In this third and final article we will deal 
with methodological schemes for Power Analysis in IR, while indicating areas 
for possible innovation using the “Arab Spring” cases as illustrations. 
  
Power, Outcomes, and what brings them together 
As we have seen in the last part, the contribution made by Barnett and Duvall 
with histaxonomy of four dimensions of power is very helpful as theoretical 
framework; nevertheless, it is still weak to implement as a methodological tool - 
it is very difficult to distinguish in a real case what is originated through the 
structure or the actor, as well as to measure if the specificity is direct or diffuse. 
But the same could be expressed about the majority of the mentioned schemes. 
In fact, Dahl itself warned about the difficulties of combining variables to 
compare power relations and argued that it depends on the requirements of the 
research.1 This complexity is even larger when normative factors are included; 
for example, despite the proposal of Nye of measuring soft power through polls 
and focus groups, he also cautioned about the limits of the intangible variables.2 
Hurt addresses certain ways of skipping the difficulties in measuring the power 
of legitimacy, such as examining: the rates of compliance, the reasons given for 
compliance and for non-compliance, the support given by the centers of Power 
and the need for legitimacy argument (akin to a counterfactual technique).3 But, 
once again, no combined power relations framework is presented. 
In addition, Lukes argues that power depends on the “significance“ of the 
outcomes, namely, in the capacity of affecting the interests of the agents. He 
refers to two methods: by changing incentives structures (indoctrination) and 
by influencing interests (subject freedom). However, Lukes confesses that the 
main question remains open: how to use certain power to shape certain 
preferences?4 
In conclusion, in these approaches no power relation mechanism explains, in a 
measurable way, how material and normative resources are combined to shape 
power and influence decisions. Therefore, I would like to subsequently suggest a 
very simple framework that may allow us to implement the knowledge 
mentioned hitherto to study specific cases in IR. 
In line with the majority of the authors, in order to make power measurable I 
consider that we have to divide it in two variables: material power (or 
simply Power) andlegitimation power (or legitimacy). In international politics, 
the power of an actor is expressed by its military (backed-by-economical) 
resources, and for the scheme it would receive “high” or “low” values. 
The legitimacy of the actors, which is based on their capacity to be perceived as 
norms-compliers and to build consensus around them5, would receive also 
“high” or “low” values. 
A power analysis based on the combination of those two variables, as it is 
shown below inillustration I, leads us to the taxonomy of four types of cases, 
each one ascribed to an “outcome”. It is important to clarify that, for this paper, 
the outcomes would reflect the domestic situation of the main agent (the State) 
given an international system; it is a sort of outside-in analysis if we take into 
account Gourevitch´s second image reversed.6 Further work has to be done to 
adapt this scheme so as to explain the conduct of the Statevis-à-vis other States 
as well as to include the domestic sphere of legitimacy. 
The first actor, which has high power and high legitimacy, could describe his 
situation as “stable”; that means, the actor would overcome the domestic and 
external challenges without internal changes and high international costs. 
The second actor, having high power but low legitimacy, is considered to be in a 
“changeable” situation. Although this actor is capable of overcoming internal 
and external challenges, due to the fact that it lacks of support from the other 
actors he could suffer from high international costs and possibly domestic 
changes. 
Illustration I – Taxonomy of Power-Legitimacy outcomes 
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To the third actor, which has low power but high legitimacy, his situation is 
defined as “protectable”. Due to his incapacity to overcome alone the internal 
and external challenges, this actor may count on the support of other actors to 
reduce the possibility of domestic changes; otherwise he will suffer from it. 
The fourth actor, with low power and low legitimacy, is placed in a 
“revolutionable” situation; that means, this actor is candidate to suffer from 
internal changes and high international costs at the time he would face 
challenges. 
Testing the Power Analysis framework with the “Arab 
Spring” 
The phenomenon known as the “Arab Spring”, composed of dozens of countries 
in which massive protests were held, constitutes an outstanding test for the 
theory. A large quantity of those cases happened in a very short range of time, 
with all the variety of domestic conditions, reactions from the regime and from 
the world, as well as different outcomes. This makes those events ideal for the 
present examination; even though it is just a “sample” of a more deeply study.7 
Although no State of those that suffered uprisings is considered in a “stable” 
situation at all, Saudi Arabia and Jordan could be mentioned as good examples 
of Arab countries that combined high power (relatively, of course) and 
high legitimacy. Their regimes faced the uprisings from the beginning (mid-
January 2011), but were capable of overcoming the internal challenges through a 
combination of repression and reforms, without suffering changes in their 
regime and being supported by the international community. 
Egypt is probably the best representation of a country whose regime kept 
high power at the moment of facing domestic challenges but received 
low legitimacy from the world; this “changeable” situation caused drastic 
changes at the top of the leadership (including the president, ministers, etc), 
albeit not of the whole regime (still leaded by the Military Council). Syria seems 
to be in a similar situation; while the power of the regime is still high, the 
legitimacy is not low enough to bring to major changes due to the sustained 
support of Russia, China and Iran. As a result, Syria constitutes today an 
excellent test for the power of legitimacy (and norms) in international politics. 
Between those countries that experienced a combination of low power and high 
legitimacy, experiencing a “protectable” situation, it is possible to mention 
Bahrain. Despite its regime was not capable of overcoming the internal revolts 
alone, it counted with the support of most of the Arab countries in the 
repression, and the Western approval of the “regional intervention” leaded by 
Gulf countries around the GCC. Yemen was in a comparable position, but at the 
end of 2011 the legitimacy of its regime was reduced when the region and the 
world understood the necessity to remove the President to maintain the 
remaining, in what was denominated later “the Yemenite option”. 
Finally, Libya constitutes the case in which the regime was in a “revolutionable” 
situation, owing to its low Power to contain the rapid domestic rebellion and its 
low legitimacy after the first days of tremendous repression. The international 
costs were so high that included a military intervention leaded by NATO (with 
the endorsement of the Arab League), that led to the total collapse of the regime. 
It is possible to say that Tunisia was in an analogous situation while it did not 
need for a civil war and an external intervention to consummate finally a 
revolution (i.e., the complete removal of the existing regime). 
  
Conclusions 
Throughout the paper we were able to observe that the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological discussions about the complex concept 
of Power maintain their relevance in the main schools of IR, and in some cases 
even constitute an essential part of their latest developments. 
At the same time, the inter-paradigmatic efforts of the last decades are 
demanding newpower analysis approaches; that means, theoretical schemes 
that would embed a combination of the different factors at stake (material and 
non-material, resources and interactions, agents and structures) to specific cases 
of study. 
Deeper examinations of the “Arab Spring” cases need to be implemented so as 
to confirm the presented findings, as it was previously said. However, these 
small samples could possibly reveal that the implementation of a framework 
that combines both material and non-material resources is possible and, even 
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